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4.1  Introduction 
Property-liability  insurance markets, especially  those for personal coverages 
such as automobile insurance, have traditionally been closely regulated. Areas 
of  government oversight include the imposition of licensing and capital re- 
quirements, the monitoring of solvency and liquidation of insolvent firms, and, 
in some cases, direct regulation of insurance rates. Under the provisions of the 
McCarran Ferguson Act of  1945, this regulation is undertaken by the individ- 
ual state governments rather than at the federal level. As a result, the extent of 
regulatory intervention and enforcement differs across locations. 
A primary area of state differences in regulation is the degree to which rates 
for private passenger automobile insurance are regulated. Just over half of the 
states intervene directly in the rate-making process for automobile insurance. 
The most common method of  rate regulation is the prior approval  system, 
under which each insurer’s rates must be approved by the state insurance com- 
missioner prior to their introduction into the market. A few states instead re- 
quire all insurers to charge rates that are set by the insurance commissioner, or 
by an industry rating bureau. The remaining states allow rates to be competi- 
tively determined, although most require that insurers file rate changes with 
the state commissioner. 
The effects of  rate regulation on insurers’ underwriting margins have been 
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the subject of numerous analyses.' Most studies assess underwriting results by 
the unit price of  insurance, the ratio of premium revenue received to losses 
incurred by  the insurer. This ratio is a measure of  the average price paid by 
insureds per dollar of benefits (loss payments) received. Early studies tended 
to find that regulation raised unit prices for automobile insurance, suggesting 
that  regulation  promoted  collusive pricing  or  inhibited  price  competition 
(Joskow  1973; Ippolito  1979; Frech and  Samprone 1980). However, these 
studies examined the time period from the late 1960s to early 1970s, a period 
when virtually all states regulated rate setting and deregulation was a very 
recent phenomenon. Later studies, availed of greater variability in regulatory 
regimes and longer time horizons for comparison, have consistently found the 
opposite result: lower unit prices for automobile insurance in states that regu- 
late rates (Pauly, Kunreuther, and Kleindorfer 1986; Harrington 1987; Grabow- 
ski et al. 1989). Thus, at least since the mid-l970s,  rate regulation has had 
the effect of reducing insurers' premium revenues relative to insured losses, 
thereby lowering the average unit price of insurance. 
The magnitude of unit price reductions under regulation has been shown to 
be relatively small on average, decreasing unit prices by  0.03 to 0.07. The 
price-decreasing effects of regulation are significantly larger in a few selected 
states, however (Hanington 1987; Grabowski et al. 1989). These findings have 
raised concerns about potential distortionary effects of rate regulation on insur- 
ance markets. Pauly et al. (1986) present indirect evidence, based on the esti- 
mation of cost functions, that rate regulation may lower quality or service pro- 
vision by  insurers. Grabowski et al. (1989) demonstrate that  stringent rate 
regulation reduces insurance availability, where availability is assessed by the 
fraction uf  drivers able to purchase insurance in the voluntary insurance mar- 
ket.* Kramer (1992) investigates the effects of  rate regulation on insurance 
company financial health and finds evidence of a relationship between strin- 
gent regulation of rates and increased risk of insurer insolvency. 
This paper investigates the hypothesis that rate regulation distorts the indus- 
trial structure of state automobile insurance markets. As noted by Harrington 
(1992), insurers will be reluctant to commit resources to regulated states if 
current regulation is excessively stringent or if the regulator cannot commit to 
an established level of regulation in future periods. More generally, restrictive 
regulation may affect the operating decisions of insurers in the state. Our anal- 
ysis focuses on how differences across insurers in costs, size, production tech- 
nology, and market position will lead to  different responses to regulation, 
1. See Harrington (1984) and Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans (1989) for comprehensive reviews 
of the literature. 
2. Residual market pools exist in all states to provide insurance to drivers unable to obtain 
coverage in the open market. Regulation that holds prices below the competitive level will increase 
the fraction of drivers insured in the residual market, due to rationing in the voluntary market 
sector. The findings of Grabowski et al. (1989) are consistent with this view of  regulation for 
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thereby distorting the industrial structure of the market. If  the net effect of 
regulation is to lower the relative market presence of the lowest cost insurance 
providers, insurance market efficiency will be adversely affected. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the industrial struc- 
ture of  automobile insurance markets. Section 4.3 discusses how differences 
in insurer organization and market position will lead to different responses to 
regulation. The remaining sections  investigate the empirical content of these ar- 
guments. Section  4.4 compares  the structure  of automobile  insurance  markets in 
regulated and unregulated states. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 provide more controlled 
investigations of the effects of rate regulation, using multivariate analysis of 
regulatory effects on state insurance market structure. The final section of the 
paper summarizes our findings and suggests future research avenues. 
4.2  The Industrial Organization of Automobile Insurance 
Automobile insurance industry statistics for 1989 are presented in table 4.1. 
We use 1989 as the basis for our cross-sectional analysis because it is a year 
Table 4.1  Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Market Statistics, 1989 
State Markets 
Statistic  National Market  Mean  S.D. 
Total premiums ($)  74,399,743,3  14  1,485,019,174  1,930,625,557 
Unit price  1.33  1.37  0.13 




National direct writers 
Auto specialists 
National auto specialists 
Big Four 
526  103.38  26.00 
101  27.88  6.71 
78  62.64  7.89 
21  18.62  2.47 
233  34.18  11.40 
20  16.98  2.39 
4  3.54  0.50 
Market share 
Direct writers  0.646  0.642  0.117 
National firms  0.697  0.701  0.125 
National direct writers  0.476  0.481  0.139 
Auto specialists  0.677  0.654  0.119 
National auto specialists  0.432  0.43 1  0.113 
Big Four  0.410  0.424  0.134 
Measure of concentration 
c4  0.417  0.540  0.086 
HHI  659  1,043  311.66 
Source: Authors’ calculations based  on A. M.  Best Company data tapes for Best’s Executive 
Data Service. 
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of calm in the insurance business cycle, and it is the most recent year before 
major changes began  in  the  insurance regulatory environment:  1989 was 
the last year that the major insurance rating bureaus issued advisory rates to 
their members, and the passage of  California’s Proposition 103 in late 1988 
prompted consideration of regulatory initiatives in other states in subsequent 
years. These changes could differentially affect the competitive strategies or 
capabilities of different types of insurers, thereby affecting market structure. 
4.2.1 
A. M. Best Company identifies 526 different groups and independent single 
companies writing positive auto insurance premiums in the United States in 
1989.3 In  keeping with the large number of  firms in the market, traditional 
measures of concentration are relatively low in the industry: the four-firm con- 
centration ratio (C4) is 42 percent, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
for the market is 659, based on direct premiums written. These values are not 
large in comparison to other industries (Klein 1989), and an HHI of  under 
1,000 falls into the range defined as “unconcentrated” by U.S. Department of 
Justice merger guidelines. 
The variation in insurer size is considerable. The largest four writers in the 
market (known in the trade press as the “Big Four”) obtain market shares of 20 
percent (State Farm), 12 percent (Allstate), 5 percent (Farmers), and 4  percent 
(Nationwide), respectively, and only 13 other firms write over 1 percent of the 
market. Yet  the largest 50 firms write over 80 percent of  all auto insurance 
premiums. Fully 90 percent of auto insurance premiums are written by only 
90 firms. To put this into perspective, this means that 436 firms share only 10 
percent df the private passenger auto insurance market. 
Insurers also differ greatly in the extent of  geographic areas served. For 
example, only 78 of the 526 firms in the market write auto insurance in all nine 
census divisions in the country. The remainder sell in only some regions of the 
country, and 191 firms sell in only a single state. Hence a vast majority of firms 
in the market have operations that are concentrated in particular geographic 
areas. While the national firms (those that sell in all nine census  division^)^ 
make up only 15 percent of insurance providers by number, these firms write 
70 percent of  total private passenger auto insurance premium volume. This 
implies that insurance markets are highly segmented by geographic location- 
with relatively few firms writing the bulk of premiums nationally and a much 
3. Best Company lists a total of  570 groups and independent sellers of private passenger auto- 
mobile insurance; however, some of these firms reported zero or negative premiums for this line 
and are omitted from the analysis. 
4.  Under the standard categorization popularized by Best Company reports, 40 firms are known 
as “national” insurance writers. However, this categorization is not based on automobile insurance 
writings: not all of these carriers sell auto insurance nationally, and there are a significant number 
of insurers categorized by Best as “regional” who do write nationally. We feel that our definition 
of national sellers is superior for purposes of analyzing the auto insurance market. 
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larger number of local or regional firms writing the balance of the market in 
their particular area. 
The data also reveal significant differences in the market presence of firms 
using different organizational  forms. There are two major systems of distribu- 
tion used in the industry. Some insurers (“direct writers”) use sales agents who 
sell exclusively the products of that specific firm. Other firms utilize the more 
traditional independent agency system, under which each agent may  sell the 
policies of a number of insurance companies. Numerous empirical studies have 
shown direct writers to be lower cost sellers of automobile insurance than inde- 
pendent agency firms (Joskow 1973; Cummins and VanDerhei 1979; Barrese 
and Nelson 1992). Yet direct writing entails larger investment in firm-specific 
assets and greater sunk costs of  entry than independent agency because the 
degree of integration and centralization is greater. 
In accordance with their operating cost advantage, direct writers dominate 
the auto insurance market, achieving a nearly 65 percent market share in 1989. 
However, consistent with the higher fixed costs of  direct writing, there are 
fewer firms employing this system than the independent agency system. Of the 
526 firms in the market only 101  are direct writers; the remaining 425 are 
independent agency writers. This fact, in conjunction with the statistics on 
market shares, implies that on average direct writers are much larger than inde- 
pendent agency writers. There are substantial size differences among direct 
writers, however; a few extremely large firms, such as State Farm and Allstate, 
significantly influence averages for the group. While the 10 largest direct writ- 
ers in the industry each write well over $1 billion in auto insurance premiums, 
the median-sized direct writer has premium revenue of  only  $39 million. 
Nonetheless, this ‘is significantly greater than the median premium volume of 
$10.5 million for independent agency writers. 
In addition to differences in market shares, there are also great differences 
in specialization across  firm^.^ Of the 526 firms writing in the market, 88 firms 
(16.3 percent of all firms) write over 90 percent of their insurance premiums 
in private passenger automobile lines, and 233 firms (44.3 percent of firms) 
write at least 50 percent of their business in auto insurance. Since private pas- 
senger auto insurance makes up only 35 percent of total property-liability in- 
surance premiums nationally, we classify these latter insurers as “auto special- 
ists.” This group contains several high-profile automobile insurers, including 
State Farm and Allstate, as well as a large number of relatively small specialist 
firms. At the other extreme from the auto specialists, 94 firms (17.9 percent of 
firms) write under 10 percent of their business in private passenger auto insur- 
ance. This latter category of  firms includes a number of  well-known brand- 
5. These differences are likely to be related to differences in organizational structure because 
of the resulting differences in cost structures and production technologies. For empirical evidence 
on the relationship between insurer organizational structure and market positioning, see Mayers 
and Smith (1988), Marvel (1982), and Regan and Tennyson (1996). 118  Susan J. Suponcic and Sharon Tennyson 
name insurance writers, including Chubb, Firemans’ Fund, and CIGNA. Al- 
though these firms may write substantial  premium volume in private passenger 
auto insurance, their relative focus on these lines is limited. 
This brief portrait of the national automobile insurance market highlights 
the great variation across firms in terms of size, geographic focus, and relative 
specialization in automobile insurance. These differences and differences in 
insurer organizational form are likely to reflect underlying differences in pro- 
duction and cost technologies. The data also show that a comparatively small 
number of firms, relative to the total number in the market, serve the vast ma- 
jority of the market at the national level. This suggests that a relatively small 
number of large producers may possess a cost or technological advantage over 
the remainder of the producers in the market. This point of view is supported 
by comparisons of insurer expense data: the Big Four, national auto specialists, 
and direct writers all exhibit significantly lower expense ratios (underwriting 
expenses as a percentage of premium volume) than other automobile insurers 
(Tennyson 1996). 
4.2.2  State Automobile Insurance Markets 
In the national automobile insurance market, we  observe a great deal of 
market segmentation by  geographic location, as evidenced by  the relatively 
small number of  firms that sell nationally. This implies that auto insurance 
markets may differ substantially across states and that state markets may look 
very different from what is suggested by national market statistics. Closer ex- 
amination of state insurance markets reveals evidence of both of these features 
in the data. 
For comparison to the national market statistics, the second and third col- 
umns of table 4.1 present means and standard deviations of the industrial char- 
acteristics of state automobile insurance markets. The number of sellers in each 
state varies from 33 to 151, with a mean value of  103, much lower than the 
national total of 526 firms. State-level values for C4 vary from 33.2 percent to 
80.4 percent, with a mean of 54 percent; the HHI by state ranges from 503 to 
2,220, with a mean of  1,043. Thus, market concentration varies a great deal 
across states and is generally greater than at the national level. 
The numbers and market shares of different types of sellers also vary across 
states. For example, the number of direct writers per state varies from 8 to 40, 
with a mean value of 28; direct writer market share by state ranges from 28 to 
88 percent, with a mean value of 64 percent. The number of national writers 
ranges from 30 to 73 across states, with a mean of 63, and their state market 
share varies from 41 to 99 percent, with a mean of 70 percent. The number of 
auto specialists per state ranges from 7 to 60, with a mean of  34, and their 
market share ranges from 33 to 82 percent, with a mean of 65 percent. 
These differences across states in the numbers of  firms and their relative 
market shares suggest that the effects of  rate regulation on market structure 
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flects the effects of  regulation, if  regulation distorts firms’ entry and output 
decisions. The remaining sections of the paper further develop and explore the 
hypothesis that differences in state insurance market structure are related to 
differences in regulatory stringency. 
4.3  Insurer Responses to Stringent Regulation 
This section of the paper considers how insurers’ choices regarding capacity 
allocation and output may respond to restrictive regulation of rates in a state 
insurance market. Consistent with the evidence presented in the previous sec- 
tion, and  with  previous characterizations of  automobile insurance markets 
(Joskow 1973), we assume that a relatively small number of firms enjoy a per- 
sistent cost advantage over the remaining firms in the market. Firms engage in 
Bertrand competition over prices, but limited capacity prevents the large firms 
from meeting the entire market demand. Entry barriers, perhaps due to scarce 
managerial inputs or to increasing returns to scale, protect this segment of the 
industry from vigorous entry. These features imply that the large, low-cost 
firms can earn greater rates of  return than the fringe firms in unregulated 
markets. 
In analyzing the effects of regulation, it is important to keep in mind that 
rate regulation does not impose a uniform price constraint on insurers. Under 
the prior approval system, each insurer’s rate proposal is supported by data on 
its loss and expense experience; the proposed rates are then evaluated with 
respect to some measure of  a fair rate of return for the insurer. Hence, rates 
can and do vary across insurers; regulation simply limits the profitability of 
business written. The implications of profit regulation will differ from those of 
a regulatory price ceiling. In particular, limits on rates of return will be most 
binding for low-cost insurance providers, whereas a price ceiling will be most 
binding for high-cost providers. 
Market structure is determined by both the market entry and exit decisions 
of firms and the output decisions of the firms that choose to sell in the market. 
We  consider first the effects of regulation on insurer entry and exit decisions. 
To the extent that regulation reduces insurer returns below those available in 
other markets, firms will choose not to enter regulated markets. Concerns 
about future regulatory stringency may also deter entry if insurers must incur 
sunk investments to enter the market (Harrington 1992). Sunk investments re- 
quired of insurers include investments in distribution and claims-handling net- 
works, advertising in local markets, and costs of regulatory compliance in the 
state. The more stringent is regulation, and the larger are the necessary sunk 
investments, the greater will be the distortions to entry. 
Incumbent firms in a market must decide whether to exit in response to 
stringent regulation. Empirical evidence from the  1960s through the early 
1980s suggests that the nature and stringency of rate regulation has changed 
over time from profit increasing to profit reducing (Pauly et al. 1986; Grabow- 120  Susan J. Suponcic and Sharon Tennyson 
ski et al.  1989). More recent evidence suggests that the trend toward more 
restrictive rate regulation may be continuing: in 1988 the state of California 
passed legislation that mandated rate rollbacks for all insurers, and at least 14 
other states have since considered similar measures. This increased regulatory 
stringency may drive incumbent firms out of the market. 
Withdrawal from regulated markets may be inhibited, however, by the exis- 
tence of fixed, state-specific inputs to production. Important inputs into insur- 
ance production are labor, real capital, and financial capital. In the short run, 
labor inputs may be variable, but capital inputs are generally fixed. What we 
term real capital includes investments in distribution networks and claims- 
handling facilities, which are fixed in the short run. Financial capital incorpo- 
rates surplus funds to bolster solvency and is also fixed. Unlike real capital, 
however, financial capital is not tied to any one line of business or state market 
even in the short run. Thus, to the extent that labor and real capital inputs are in 
place, insurers can quickly and costlessly reallocate capacity across insurance 
markets by a simple reallocation of financial resources. Insurers may neverthe- 
less be slow to withdraw entirely from a regulated market because real capital 
resources are not mobile across markets in the short run. 
There are also other factors at work that imply that insurers’ response to 
rate regulation may be to reduce market share rather than to exit the market. 
Regulators in many states have the ability to force insurers to pay explicit or 
implicit exit ransoms. For example, the courts have consistently upheld the 
ability of regulators to withdraw licenses for all business in the state if  an in- 
surer wishes to withdraw from a heavily regulated line such as automobile 
insurance. Some states also force withdrawing insurers to continue contribu- 
tions to thk residual market deficit for a period of time after withdrawal from 
the state (Cummins and Tennyson 1992). These actions will significantly raise 
exit costs for insurers in regulated markets, which may discourage or slow the 
pace of  exit (Harrington 1992). Firms that operate in more than one line of 
insurance may  be  especially  slow to  exit  the regulated line  as this  could 
threaten licenses to write in other lines in the state. 
One hypothesis that can be drawn from this discussion is that, all else equal, 
fewer firms will choose to operate in regulated states, since entry is relatively 
unattractive and exit is relatively attractive in these markets. Predictions re- 
garding the relative numbers of different types of firms are less clear-cut, how- 
ever.  We  might expect the number of  direct writers in regulated insurance 
markets to be relatively lower than the number of independent agency writers 
because direct writing requires greater sunk investments in the market and 
hence direct writer entry into regulated environments will be discouraged. 
However, once these investments have been made they will inhibit exit if the 
regulatory environment worsens, implying that direct writers could be more 
prevalent under regulation. On  the other hand, firms using the independent 
agency system tend to be less specialized in automobile insurance than direct 
writers (Regan and Tennyson 1996). This may slow their rate of exit from unfa- 121  Regulation and Industrial Organization 
vorable market environments since their lack of specialization implies greater 
costs of exit in terms of profits forgone in unregulated lines of insurance. 
National firms, especially those specializing in automobile insurance, may 
be quick to exit unprofitable auto insurance markets because their costs of exit 
may be lower due to their existing distribution networks elsewhere. However, 
market exit implies dismantling state distribution networks, and reentry at a 
later date would involve additional start-up costs. These firms may thus find it 
less costly to reduce market share than to exit, since they can easily reallocate 
financial resources to the most profitable state markets. 
If  regulation is not sufficiently stringent to induce market exit, regulatory 
profit restrictions will nonetheless lead to reductions in output in the regulated 
lines of business. The relative reliance on state-specific real capital inputs and 
alternative opportunities for the use of financial capital will determine differ- 
ences in output reductions across insurers in response to regulation. This rea- 
soning yields definitive predictions about the relative effects of restrictive rate 
regulation on the market shares of different types of firms. 
Low-cost producers, especially those with existing distribution systems in 
other less stringently regulated states, should reduce output the most in the 
face of rate regulation. This reflects the ability of firms with lower production 
costs to achieve higher rates of return than other firms in the absence of regula- 
tion. These producers thus have higher opportunity costs of devoting resources 
to a regulated market for which rates of return are held below those achievable 
elsewhere.  A national distribution system also lowers the cost to a firm of re- 
ducing market share in a regulated state since the firm can reallocate financial 
resources to othef state markets without new investments in real capital inputs. 
The (opportunity) costs of  capacity reallocation may vary with the output 
mix of the insurer, however. Greater diversity of exposures across lines of busi- 
ness in a state may increase the costs of reducing auto insurance market share if 
this adversely affects the insurer’s reputation or relationships  with sales agents. 
Hence, market share reductions under regulation may be most observable in 
national firms that specialize in automobile insurance. This reasoning also im- 
plies that direct writers should have lower market shares in regulated states 
since these firms tend to be low-cost producers of automobile insurance. This 
should be especially true for direct writers that operate nationally. 
4.4  Market Structure in Regulated and Unregulated States 
The theoretical discussion above suggests a number of  dimensions along 
which automobile insurance market structure may be affected by rate regula- 
tion. The remaining sections of the paper investigate the extent to which these 
distortions occur in practice, by  examining differences in insurance market 
structure across regulated and unregulated states. 
In this section of the paper we examine data on the mean values of the num- 
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year 1989. The analysis is undertaken at the level of state aggregates, for all 
private passenger automobile insurance coverages combined. States are first 
grouped into two  basic categories-regulated  and unregulated. Consistent 
with previous studies, states that employ prior approval regulation, state-made 
rates, or mandatory bureau rates are considered regulated; states that primarily 
require insurers to file rates rather than to seek approval of rates are considered 
unregulated. The regulatory system employed in each state was determined 
from information obtained from the National Association of Insurance Com- 
missioners and the Alliance of American Insurers. 
The state of California is omitted from this portion of the analysis because 
of the passage of Proposition 103 in late 1988. This controversial legislation 
introduced prior approval regulation of insurance rates, along with a number 
of other controls on the practices of insurers in that state. Due to the lags inher- 
ent in implementation of these regulations and to the continuing challenges of 
the legislation by insurers, it is unclear whether California should be consid- 
ered regulated or unregulated in 1989. Our sample thus contains 25 regulated 
states and 24 unregulated states.6 
To further differentiate those states that are the most heavily regulated, we 
also classify five states that have extremely large residual markets for automo- 
bile insurance as states with “stringent” regulation. All states operate residual 
markets for automobile insurance, which are designed to provide at least mini- 
mal coverage to those individuals unable to obtain insurance in the private 
market. Previous studies have documented that stringent regulation of insur- 
ance rates is associated with large fractions of the population insured through 
these residual mechanisms (Grabowski et al. 1989). The five stringently regu- 
lated statis in our sample are Massachusetts, New  Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina. In each of these states at least 20 percent 
of drivers were insured in the residual market throughout the 1980s.’ 
Table 4.2 compares summary measures of market structure for unregulated 
states, regulated states, and stringently regulated states. We first note that, con- 
sistent with intuition, the average number of firms selling automobile insurance 
is lower in regulated and stringently regulated states than in the unregulated 
states. This difference is significant at the 10 percent confidence level for regu- 
lated versus unregulated states, and significant at the 1 percent confidence level 
for stringently regulated versus unregulated states. This comparison is particu- 
larly meaningful since the table also shows no significant differences in the 
average size of  the auto insurance market across these sets of  states, where 
6. Including California in either state category significantly affects the results of the comparison 
of mean values. 
7. By comparison, unregulated states insured only an average of  1.2 percent of drivers in the 
residual market, and other regulated states insured on average 2.3 percent of  drivers in the residual 
market, over the time period  1980-90.  However, two regulated states (New York and Rhode Is- 
land) insured between 10 and 15 percent of drivers in the residual market for at least some portion 
of this time period. Table 4.2  Private Passenger  Automobile Insurance Statistics by State Regulatory Status, 1989 
Statistic 
Unregulated  Regulated  Stringent 
Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Total premiums (thousand $) 
Unit price 
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*Significantly different from unregulated states at the 10 percent confidence level, one-sided test. 
**Significantly different from unregulated states at the 5 percent confidence level, one-sided test. 
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market size is measured by total written premium volume.8  Hence, the fact that 
there are fewer firms writing in regulated state markets is not attributable to 
differences in market size. The same result holds for each specific type of 
insurance seller: in every category of  firm examined, there are fewer firms 
operating in regulated and  stringently regulated states than in unregulated 
states. This is what we would expect if rate regulation affects firms’ incentives 
for market entry and exit. 
The largest percentage reductions in number of firms are for direct writers 
and for auto specialists. Relative to unregulated states, on average there are 19 
percent fewer direct writers and 18 percent fewer auto specialists in regulated 
states, and 35 percent fewer direct writers and 37 percent fewer auto specialists 
in stringently regulated states. This compares to an 11 percent reduction in the 
total number of  firms in regulated states, and a 23 percent reduction in the 
number of firms in stringently regulated states, relative to the unregulated state 
average. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with rela- 
tively high proportions of business in the regulated line will be less likely to 
enter and more likely to exit when faced with profit restrictions. The results for 
direct writers may also reflect the effects on entry of greater sunk investments 
required for direct writers to enter a market. 
The numbers of firms in the various “national” categories included in the 
table are reduced significantly by regulation and stringent regulation, but by 
less in percentage terms than the reduction in the total number of firms. This 
may reflect a greater tendency by  these firms to reduce market share in rela- 
tively unprofitable markets rather than to exit. It may also be a consequence of 
the definition of national firm in our study, however, which requires that the 
firm sell auto insurance in a substantial number of states. This latter interpreta- 
tion is supported by the fact that the number of Big Four auto insurers (State 
Farm, Allstate, Nationwide, and Farmers) is lower in regulated and stringently 
regulated states, and by  a greater percentage than the reduction in the total 
number of firms.9 
Similar to the findings on numbers of firms, direct writers also exhibit lower 
market shares in regulated and stringently regulated states. The largest market 
share reductions are for auto specialists and the Big Four, however. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that low-cost producers have the greatest incen- 
tive to shift resources out of a market in response to regulatory profit restric- 
tions. 
Interestingly, the national categories of  firms do not exhibit significantly 
8. The same is true if market size is measured by the number of car years insured or the number 
of automobiles registered in the state. 
9. This is due largely to the fact that Farmers writes auto insurance only in 32 states, spanning 
six census divisions; thus, by our definition, Farmers is not a national auto insurer. Farmers does 
not write in many eastern states, and these states are more likely to be  regulated than those in other 
regions. This leaves open the question of whether Farmers’ entry decisions are motivated by  re- 
gional issues or by regulation; this is addressed further in the regression analysis below. 125  Regulation and Industrial Organization 
lower market shares in regulated states, and national firms as a group actually 
have a significantly larger market share in regulated and stringently regulated 
states than in unregulated states. This result at first appears to contradict our 
theory, since a national distribution system should make it easy to reduce mar- 
ket share in response to regulation. However, many of the national firms (57 of 
78) use the independent agency system of  selling, and these firms tend to be 
high-cost  producers  of  automobile  insurance.  Expense ratio  evidence  also 
shows that national firms on the whole are not low-cost producers of automo- 
bile insurance (Tennyson 1996). Hence, national firms may have less incentive 
than other firms to reduce market share in response to profit restrictions. In 
addition, many independent agency firms write a significant fraction of their 
business  in  lines  other than  automobile  insurance  and  hence  may  be con- 
strained to offer auto insurance as a condition of keeping customers and agents 
satisfied. Nonetheless, neither national direct writers nor national auto special- 
ists exhibit significantly lower market shares in regulated states. 
4.5  The Effect of Regulation on Market Structure 
This section of the paper uses regression analysis to further investigate the 
effects of rate regulation on insurance market structure. This approach allows 
us to more precisely isolate regulatory effects by controlling for other features 
of the state that might be related to market structure, In addition, it allows us 
to pool data over several years in order to estimate the effect of regulation on 
average over time rather than using data for a single year. This may be impor- 
tant if there is noise in the data in any given year, or if  there are systematic 
effects on market structure by year (e.g., the insurance cycle) that may imply 
that a single year is unrepresentative of true regulatory effects. The regression 
analysis is undertaken using annual data for all 50 states over the time period 
As in the previous section, several different features of market structure are 
analyzed. The basic hypothesis  that regulation  reduces  incentives  to sell in 
the state is tested by examining the total number of firms writing automobile 
insurance in the state. We also estimate the effects of  regulation  on both the 
numbers and the market shares of several different types of firms to investigate 
the effects of regulation on the relative incentives to operate in the market. We 
estimate models for the numbers and market shares of national firms, direct 
writers,  national  direct writers,  national  auto specialists,  and  the  Big  Four 
auto insurers. 
To  test for regulatory effects on market  structure, we define a regulation 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the state uses prior approval regulation, 
1987-92.'' 
10. We  treat California as a regulated state beginning in 1989. The estimation results are not 
sensitive to changing the effective date of regulation in this state or to the elimination of California 
from the sample. The results are also similar if only those states that maintained consistent regula- 
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state-made rates, or mandatory bureau rates. To test whether there are differ- 
ences in regulatory effects between regulated states in general and those most 
stringently regulated, we include a dummy variable equal to one if a state has 
stringent regulation of rates.'I Stringent  regulation is defined as in the previous 
section to include those states for which the residual market constituted more 
than 20 percent of  the total insurance market throughout the decade of  the 
1980s. 
In addition to other control variables, discussed in more detail below, each 
regression model includes dummy variables for eight of the nine census divi- 
sions in the country to control for potentially omitted regional influences on 
insurance market structure. Of  particular concern is the possibility that re- 
gional differences in the tendency of states to regulate insurance markets, cou- 
pled with locational factors that may influence firms' entry decisions (e.g., dis- 
tance from the firms' headquarters), may lead to spurious inferences regarding 
the effects of regulation on insurance markets. Including the regional variables 
in the model assures that the estimated regulatory effects are net of such loca- 
tional influences. The models also include dummy variables for the years 
1988-92,  to allow for year-specific fixed effects on insurance market structure. 
Summary statistics for all of the variables included in the regression analysis 
are reported in the data appendix. 
4.5.1 
We first estimate the effect of regulation on the total number of firms, and on 
the numbers of firms of several specific types, operating in the state automobile 
insurance market. Several variables other than rate regulation are included in 
the models'to control for insurance market characteristics that may affect the 
number of firms operating. Key among these is the size of the automobile 
insurance market. All else equal, we expect to observe a larger number of firms 
writing in larger insurance markets. The potential size of the automobile insur- 
ance market in a state is measured by  the natural logarithm of the number of 
registered automobiles in the state. 
The percentage of the population that moved into the state during the decade 
of the 1980s is included in the model as an indicator of state growth and eco- 
nomic dynamism. We expect this variable to be positively related to the num- 
ber of firms in the market since high growth should attract entrants into the 
market. State per capita income is included as a measure of the demand for 
insurance and insurance services in the state. Income should be positively re- 
lated to insurance demand and hence to the number of insurers in the market. 
The Effect of Regulation on the Number of Sellers 
11. In an  earlier version of the paper we also tried a continuous index of regulatory stringency, 
based on Conning and Company surveys of  insurance and regulatory executives that assign an 
index number of  competitive freedom to each state insurance market (Suponcic and Tennyson 
1995). Previous analysis has shown this index to be highly correlated with indicators of the type 
of regulatory system in a state (Suponcic 1994). The estimation  results using this alternative mea- 
sure of regulation are similar to those using the two regulation dummy variables. 127  Regulation and Industrial Organization 
However, previous studies have argued that the demand for insurance services 
will vary with income (Pauly et al. 1986), and this could have confounding 
effects on the number of firms if there are scale economies in service provision. 
We therefore have no strong priors about the effect of this variable. 
The degree of market segmentation by risk categories may also influence 
market structure. The primary rating factor used for automobile insurance is 
the geographic location of the insured vehicle, with different locations in the 
state assigned to different rating territories. We  therefore include the number 
of standard rating territories per registered car in the state (territory density) as 
a measure of market segmentation. We expect to observe more insurance firms 
operating in more segmented markets, implying a positive coefficient on the 
territory density variable. The relative locational density of the consuming pop- 
ulation in the state may  also help to determine the number of  sellers in the 
market; this possibility is controlled for by including each state’s population 
density, defined as resident population divided by land area, in the regression 
model. This variable should also be positively related to the number of firms 
in the market since greater customer density should support greater numbers 
of firms. 
The ordinary least squares estimation results are reported in table 4.3. As 
hypothesized, the total number of firms operating is significantly lower in regu- 
lated states, and lower still in stringently regulated states. The marginal effect 
of regulation is to lower the number of firms in the market by 3.8; in stringently 
regulated states the average reduction in the number of  firms is 29.6. This 
amounts to a 3.5 percent reduction in the number of firms in regulated states, 
and a 27.3 percent reduction in stringently regulated states, relative to the un- 
regulated state aierage. 
Regulation also significantly reduces the number of  each distinct type of 
firm in the market, and as expected, the reductions are much larger in strin- 
gently regulated states. The effects of regulation are greatest for national auto 
specialists, relative to the mean number of these firms writing in unregulated 
states. After controlling for other market features, on average there are 6.2 
percent fewer national specialist firms in regulated markets, and 23.9 percent 
fewer in stringently regulated states, relative to the unregulated state average. 
The magnitude of regulatory effects on the numbers of firms are similar for 
national direct writers, national firms overall, and direct writers overall. The 
results for the Big Four are of  only marginal statistical significance and of 
economically insignificant magnitude, presumably because of the small num- 
ber of firms in this category. 
4.5.2  The Effect of Regulation on Market Shares 
The effect of regulation on the number of firms in the market reflects regula- 
tory effects on firms’ entry and exit decisions. As argued earlier, however, re- 
ductions in output are the more likely short-run response to regulatory profit 
restrictions, as they are less costly and easier to implement than market exit Table 4.3  Number of Firms, 1987-92 Data by State (ordinary least squares estimation) 
Variable  Total Firms  Direct Writers  National Firms  National Direct Writers  National  Auto Specialists  Big Four 
Intercept 
Log registered autos 
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decisions. Accordingly, this section of  the paper examines the effect of  rate 
regulation on the state market shares of large, national and low-cost automo- 
bile insurance producers. As in previous sections, we focus on direct writers, 
national writers, national direct writers, national auto specialists, and the Big 
Four. The market share of each category of firm is measured as the percentage 
of  total  state automobile insurance premiums written by  firms included in 
that category. Because market shares of necessity lie between zero and one, 
the dependent variables used here are the log-odds ratios of  market  shares 
ln(share/(l -  share)) for each category of  firm. This transformation ensures 
that the predicted values of market shares from the least squares regressions 
lie between zero and one. 
Our empirical models of  the determinants of  the state market shares are 
similar to those for the numbers of firms operating in the state. The control 
variables included in the market share models are state per capita income, state 
population density, the proportion of the population that moved into the state 
between 1980 and 1990, and the ratio of  automobile bodily injury claims to 
property damage claims in the state. 
To the extent that higher per capita income indicates a higher level of insur- 
ance demand, income should be positively related to the market shares of low- 
cost firms since they should devote more resources to relatively attractive mar- 
kets; however, if  the demand for services increases with income, low-price, 
low-service firms may have lower market shares in high-income states (Pauly 
et al. 1986). Population density and the percentage of  the population that re- 
cently moved into the state may be negatively related to market shares since 
these variables positively affect the number of firms in the market. Alterna- 
tively, higher poIjulation density and a more mobile population may give direct 
writer and national insurers a marketing advantage since these firms are more 
likely to use mass advertising to obtain customers.'* 
The bodily injury claims variable is added to this set of models as a measure 
of the relative riskiness of auto insurance in the state. Since bodily injury liabil- 
ity claims are the most expensive and unpredictable component of auto insur- 
ance claims, a higher rate of bodily injury claims may lead insurers to reduce 
their exposure in the market. The impact of  these claims on relative output 
levels across insurers will depend on their relative expertise in underwriting 
and settling these claims. This makes strong predictions difficult at the level of 
aggregation in this study. However, if there are economies of scale with respect 
to underwriting and settlement of  liability claims this would imply that the 
market shares of  the largest firms should be positively related to the rate of 
bodily injury claims. 
The parameter estimates from ordinary least squares estimation are reported 
in table 4.4. The results indicate relatively weak effects of regulation on the 
12. See Marvel (1982) for a theoretical analysis of why direct writers are  more likely to use 
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market shares of the five groups of firms studied. The regulatory dummy vari- 
able is not significantly related to the market shares of national direct writers, 
national auto specialists, or the Big Four. For national firms as a group, the 
regulation dummy variable has the opposite sign from that expected. This latter 
finding may be due to the fact that most of the national insurers market through 
independent agents. Thus, we expect that their reduction in output in response 
to regulation will be lower than that of direct writers or other low-cost produc- 
ers. This implies an increase in net market share in regulated states for these 
firms. 
All five groups of firms exhibit significantly lower market shares in the most 
stringently regulated states, as expected. The estimated magnitude of market 
share reduction in these states is similar for national firms, national direct writ- 
ers, and national auto specialists. These estimates range from 20 percent for 
national firms to 24 percent for national auto specialists, relative to their re- 
spective average market shares in unregulated states. These results are consis- 
tent with the argument that insurers with national distribution systems will 
respond to profit-reducing regulation by reducing output in the state. 
These findings notwithstanding, there are two  unexpected results in the 
table. First, the results for the Big Four are not entirely consistent with our 
theory. While these firms’ aggregate market share is significantly reduced un- 
der stringent regulation, they exhibit the smallest percentage reduction in mar- 
ket share (4 percent) of all the categories of firms examined. In addition, direct 
writers are the only firms with a significantly lower market share in all regu- 
lated states. This latter finding is consistent with previous studies and may 
reflect other features of regulation that place direct writers at a disadvantage 
(e.g., Pauly et al. 1986; Gron 1995). 
Alternatively, these results may reflect problems with interpreting the effects 
of  regulation in a static analysis if  insurance market  structure influences a 
state’s choice of regulatory regime. For example, if states with higher automo- 
bile insurance premiums are more likely to enact rate regulation, then the regu- 
latory regime and insurance market structure are likely to be jointly deter- 
mined.13 To  provide  stronger evidence that  rate  regulation  influences the 
structure of the insurance market rather than the reverse, the next section of the 
paper examines the impact of rate regulation on changes in insurance market 
structure over time.14 
13. Cummins, Phillips, and Tennyson (1997) find that states with higher auto accident rates, 
higher auto claims severity, and higher proportions of young drivers are more likely to regulate 
auto insurance rates. However, they find no independent effect of a state’s average unit price for 
auto insurance on the propensity to regulate. 
14. Previous empirical work supports the view that both the choice of regulatory regime and 
the stringency of rate regulation in regulated states are affected by variables measuring the poten- 
tial political influence of the insurance industry in the state (Cummins et al. 1997).  We attempted 
two-stage least squares analysis of market shares, treating rate regulation and stringent rate regula- 
tion as endogenous. However, the results  were extremely sensitive to model specification and 
yielded poor statistical fit overall. Nevertheless, these models usually produced results similar to 
those found in the first-differences regressions presented in the next section. 132  Susan J. Suponcic and Sharon Tennyson 
Table 4.5  Private Passenger Automobile Insurance Market Structure Changes 
by State Regulatory Status, 1987-92  (percentage  change) 
Unregulated  Regulated  Stringent 
Statistic  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Total premiums 




National direct writers 





National direct writers 
National auto specialists 
Big Four 
43.1  9.4  47.5  22.7  50.8  43.6 
-3.9  6.6  -8.0**  6.9  -10.5  10.7 
-10.6  8.8  -8.3  13.1  -3.9*  8.8 
-1.4  5.0  -5.8**  7.8  -11.0*  10.9 
1.5  9.5  0.3  11.6  2.7  12.3 
1.7  11.0  -4.2*  10.8  -6.7  14.9 
-1.1  6.6  -4.0  9.7  -8.0*  9.4 
7.7  5.3  8.8  10.3  6.5  16.7 
0.8  4.5  -0.4  8.8  -6.0  16.3 
9.3  6.6  10.6  9.8  1.3  15.9 
13.3  8.0  16.5  11.0  11.0  11.8 
8.6  7.0  6.1  23.7  -4.1  49.3 
*Significantly different from unregulated states at the 10 percent confidence level, one-sided test. 
**Significantly different from unregulated states at the 5 percent confidence level, one-sided test. 
***Significantly different from unregulated states at the 1 percent confidence level, one-sided test. 
4.6  Regulation and Market Structure Change 
Our theoretical argument is that persistently restricted rates of return should 
cause large, low-cost insurance sellers to reduce their market presence relative 
to that which would occur in an unregulated market environment.  The strong- 
est test of  this argument rests on the dynamic implications of regulation for 
insurance market structure. If regulation affects the output choices of firms in 
the manner hypothesized,  we should observe that the market presence of large, 
low-cost firms has declined, or has grown less rapidly, in regulated states than 
in unregulated states. 
Table 4.5 presents summary statistics on the net percentage changes in our 
measures of market structure over the period 1987-92  for unregulated, regu- 
lated, and stringently regulated states. To preserve comparability of statistics 
across years, and to avoid picking up transitional effects of regulatory regime 
change, this analysis excludes several states that changed regulatory regimes 
during or just prior to our sample period. The table shows that the changes in 
market structure over the period are very similar for regulated and unregulated 
states overall. Except for a greater decline in the total number of firms and in 
the number of national firms and the Big Four in regulated states, there are 
no statistically significant differences in market trends across regulated and 
unregulated states. Both groups of states exhibit consolidation of the insurance 133  Regulation and Industrial Organization 
market: the average number of firms declined over the period, but the aggregate 
market shares of direct writers and national sellers increased. 
There are also few statistically significant differences in market trends be- 
tween stringently regulated states and unregulated states. However, this is due 
to the large variance in the experiences of stringently regulated states. There 
are some noticeable differences in the patterns of change for these states. The 
percentage decline in the number of firms overall is much greater than that in 
unregulated states, as is the decline in the number of national firms, national 
auto specialists, and the Big Four. The mean percentage change in market 
shares for national firms and the Big Four are also different in stringently regu- 
lated states, where these two sets of firms actually lost market share over the 
time period. 
The patterns of  market structure change in stringently regulated states are 
not inconsistent with the hypothesis that national insurance sellers have de- 
creased their market presence in response to regulation. However, the generally 
mixed findings and the lack of  statistical significance make the relationship 
between stringent regulation and market structure difficult to ascertain. To con- 
trol for other features of state insurance markets that might influence changes 
in market structure, table 4.6 presents a regression analysis of annual changes 
in market structure for the years 1988-92.  Because annual changes in the num- 
ber of  firms and market shares are relatively small, the dependent variables 
used in the analysis are annual change in premium volume for each category 
of firm.15 The premium data are transformed into logarithms to reduce hetero- 
scedasticity. The control variables included in the regression model are those 
in the market share models estimated previously, along with the annual change 
in the (logarithm of) statewide automobile insurance premiums. 
The regression results are generally consistent with the results obtained in 
the static analysis of market shares. There are no significant effects of regula- 
tion overall, but stringent rate regulation is negatively and significantly related 
to annual changes in premium volume for national direct writers, national auto 
specialists, and the Big Four. This confirms that our earlier findings are not 
simply an artifact of states’ endogenous choices of regulatory regime. 
Relative to overall state auto insurance premium growth, the table shows 
that the Big Four and national auto specialists have increased their market pres- 
ence over time, once other factors are controlled for. The market shares of 
direct writers, national firms as a whole, and national direct writers are declin- 
ing. The findings for stringently regulated states thus mean that the writings of 
the Big Four and national auto specialists have increased less over time, rela- 
tive to the growth in state automobile insurance premiums, in states that strin- 
gently regulate automobile insurance rates. The writings of national firms and 
15. The models were also run on market share changes, with similar results. The models for 
changes in the numbers of firms showed no significant effects, and the overall fit was very poor. Table 4.6  First-Difference of Log Premiums, 1988-92 Data by State (ordinary least squares  estimation) 
Variable 
Intercept 
First-difference  of log 
state auto premiums 
Per capita income 
Population density 
Percent movers 
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Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The model also includes year and census division dummy variables not reported here. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 10 percent confidence level, two-sided test. 
**Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent confidence level, two-sided test. 
***Significantly different from zero at the 1 percent confidence level, two-sided test. 135  Regulation and Industrial Organization 
national direct writers in stringently regulated states have decreased more rap- 
idly, relative to the growth in state automobile insurance premiums, than in 
other states. 
Unlike in previous regressions, the most significant effects are observed for 
the Big Four automobile insurance writers, and the largest percentage effects 
on premium volume changes are for the Big Four and national auto specialists. 
Rate regulation, even stringent rate regulation, is not significantly related to 
changes in premium volume for direct writers.16 These findings are consistent 
with our theoretical predictions that low-cost firms with national distribution 
systems will have the greatest incentives to reduce output in regulated states. 
4.7  Conclusion 
This paper has argued that restrictive regulation of  automobile insurance 
rates will distort the industrial structure of  the market through its effects on 
insurers’ entry and output decisions. The empirical evidence presented in the 
paper suggests that these effects are very weak in most regulated states. How- 
ever, in those states that most stringently regulate automobile insurance rates, 
the empirical results are consistent with our theory. We  find that stringent rate 
regulation lowers the number of firms selling in the market and lowers the 
numbers, market shares, and output growth of low-cost and national producers 
in the market. These results hold even after controlling for other factors that 
may influence the relative prevalence of  these firms in the market, such as 
market size, density and growth, consumer income, and regional effects. 
While normative assessments of regulatory policies lie beyond the scope of 
this analysis, our findings suggest that regulation could have  adverse unin- 
tended effects on consumer welfare. If firms that achieve the largest size or 
that specialize most heavily in automobile insurance are the lowest cost pro- 
ducers of this insurance, then the decline in their relative market presence un- 
der regulation may raise the average price of insurance paid by consumers. 
Much remains to be done to fully understand the effects of regulation on the 
industrial structure of  auto insurance markets. One potentially fruitful ap- 
proach would be to examine changes in market structure in the aftermath of 
changes in regulatory stringency. Further insights into the causes and conse- 
quences of market structure  differences across regulated and unregulated states 
could also be garnered from analyzing entry, exit, and market share changes at 
the firm or group level. Use of this more detailed data would allow for controls 
related to the specific characteristics  of each firm, rather than the average char- 
acteristics of  generic categories of insurers. Given the great variation in size 
and specialization across firms identified in this paper, examining data at the 
16. Interestingly, the contrast between these results and the results of the static  market share 
analysis suggests that a larger direct writer market share reduces the probability that a state enacts 
rate regulation, while a larger market share for the Big Four increases the probability that a state 
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firm level may  be particularly important for assessing regulatory effects on 
insurance markets. 
Data Appendix 
This appendix provides the precise definition of and documents the data source 
used to obtain each explanatory variable used in the regression analysis. It also 
reports the mean and standard deviation of each variable over the sample pe- 
riod  1987-92  (see table 4A.1). All dependent variables used in the analysis 
were obtained from A. M. Best Company data tapes for Best’s Executive Data 
Service. The other variable definitions and sources are as follows. 
Number of  registered autos: Number of privately owned motor vehicles reg- 
istered in the state. Source: U.S. Department of  Transportation, Highway Sta- 
tistics. 
Per capita income: Total income per capita in the state. Source: U.S. Depart- 
ment of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of  the United States. 
Population density: Resident population per square mile of land area in the 
state. Source: U.S.  Department of  Commerce, Statistical  Abstract  of  the 
United States. 
Table 4A.1  Summary Statistics for Regression Variables, 1987-92 Data by State 
Variable  Mean  S.D.  N 
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National auto specialists 
Big Four 
Other variables 
log (Registered autos) 
Per capita income 
Population density 
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Percent movers 1980-90 
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Territory density: Number of rating territories employed by the major statis- 
tical rating agency in the state divided by the number of registered automobiles 
in the state. Source for rating territories: Insurance Research Council, Trends 
in Auto Bodily Injury Claims (Oak Brook, Ill., 1990). 
Percent movers: Fraction of the state’s resident population in 1990 who lived 
in a different state in 1980. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce,  Statistical 
Abstract of  the United States. 
Bodily injury  claims: Number of  automobile bodily injury liability insur- 
ance claims incurred in the state divided by the number of automobile  property 
damage liability insurance claims paid in the state. Source: National Associa- 
tion of Independent Insurers, FastTrack Monitoring System database. 
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